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Delaney and the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives:  
Lessons for the Teaching of EU Law 
 
Abstract     
 
A recent series of cases relating to the EU motor vehicle insurance directives and 
their application in the UK makes for interesting reading. It is in the UK’s negligent 
transposition, and a lack of knowledge and awareness by lawyers and judges in the 
cases of the interaction between domestic and EU law, which compounds the 
negative effects. The issues raised in Delaney v Pickett [2011] and Delaney v 
Secretary of State [2014] generate concern not just as to the implications they have 
to the application of EU law principles, but have resonance with the way in which EU 
law is taught in many universities. In this article we suggest that reconsidering the 
method and purpose of EU teaching may better serve the EU-lawyers needed for the 
future.   
 
Introduction 
 
Perhaps it is time to rethink the way we teach EU law in Higher Education?1 Our 
graduates who become lawyers (and judges) often do not use EU law effectively. 
The understanding, correct identification and application of EU law continues to be 
an essential weapon in the lawyer’s arsenal,2 to serve their client’s interests but also 
with the broader and more significant function of ensuring national law is compliant 
                                            
1 A referendum on continued membership of the EU (commonly referred to as Brexit) will be held on 
23 June 2016. The outcome of the referendum may have repercussions for EU laws and their effect 
on the UK legal system, the teaching of EU law at University, and the implications for the cases 
referred to in this article. However, it should be remembered that whilst Art. 50 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union provides for an exit mechanism for Member States that wish to 
withdraw from the EU, even on the basis of a ‘yes’ to withdrawing vote, it will take several years for 
the exit to be effective (and hence the applicable laws here, and the lawyers who will be involved, will 
be affected for several years into the future). Further, future agreements will likely lead to the 
government latterly agreeing to an ongoing relationship with the EU, on the basis of a free trade 
agreement. Therefore, EU law and its impact on legal education is likely to remain relevant in some 
form for the foreseeable future. 
2 Historically, and before the study of EU Law was a formal requirement of the Qualifying Law Degree, 
UK lawyers had significant gaps in their knowledge (two-thirds of respondents admitting their 
knowledge to be inadequate). Indeed, the EU Commission’s research demonstrated that only 33% of 
lawyers in the member states used EU Law in their practice, and in several instances, lawyers were 
being sued for professional negligence by their clients for damages incurred as a result of this gap in 
knowledge and understanding (see The Law Society Gazette ‘A Costly Knowledge Gap -- Lawyers in 
the European Union Know so Little EU Law They are Being Sued by Clients for Professional 
Negligence’ April 1995. http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/a-costly-knowledge-gap-lawyers-in-the-
european-union-know-so-little-eu-law-they-are-being-sued-by-clients-for-professional-
negligence/19936.fullarticle: [last accessed 18 April 2016]. The Lord Chancellor's Advisory Committee 
Report on Legal Education and Conduct ‘First Report on Legal Education and Training’ April 1996 
highlighted this deficiency in the education of future lawyers, but concerns continue in 2015 with the 
Young Legal Aid Lawyers organisation reporting that the SRA’s current Statement of Knowledge does 
not provide adequate detail for lawyers. EU Law, for instance, is included under the general heading 
‘Constitutional law and EU law’ along with public and administrative law, discrimination and the 
Human Rights Act (Response of Young Legal Aid Lawyers to SRA Consultation: “Training for 
Tomorrow - A Competence State for Solicitors” January 2015: 
http://www.younglegalaidlawyers.org/sites/default/files/YLAL%20SRA%20response%20competence
%20.pdf) [last accessed 18 April 2016]. 
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with EU obligations. We as tutors should carefully consider how we ensure that the 
next generation of lawyers can take up the mantle of being advocates, but also 
scholars who use their research training and knowledge of how laws interrelate and 
overlap. Using just one example3 (motor vehicle insurance law), it appears that all 
too frequently lawyers accept, on face value, laws as enacted domestically without 
consideration of their place in the supranational hierarchy of the UK’s dual 
constitution. This article is presented as a discussion piece to demonstrate the 
effects that often misguided teaching of EU law has for groups of the most 
vulnerable people who seek legal help, but which also has implications for the ability 
to hold the government to account. 
 
The Europeanisation of law, legal practice and legal education is not a new 
phenomenon in this jurisdiction or beyond.4 Whereas traditionally the concept of 
Europeanisation has focused on educating the next generation of lawyers to think 
supranationally,5 here we are commenting on the ability for the UK law graduate and 
future lawyer to be able to critique domestic implementing legislation. The aim is to 
produce lawyers with an awareness of the construction of EU parent laws and who 
can identify the correct implementation of national law. Where this is not the case, 
they will be sufficiently competent in accessing the enforcement mechanisms at 
domestic and the EU levels. Armed with this knowledge, the lawyer will be able to 
provide his/her client with the most appropriate legal advice and to be in a position to 
provide robust argument where needed. However, some similarity does exist with 
previous studies regarding producing European law graduates.6 It is agreed that 
legal education in EU law does require reorientation towards a European law focus, 
necessitating comparative legal perspectives7 and critical analysis and application. 
Given the pervasive nature of EU law, such an approach, we argue, would 
significantly benefit students in the discrete modules studied which are affected by 
EU law. Much more significantly, it would arm future lawyers with a mindset of being 
                                            
3 Many other examples could have been provided however. For instance, in employment law the 
protection and preservation of transferring workers’ rights as required in the Acquired Rights Directive 
(ARD - Directive 98/50/EC [1998] OJ L201/88) was incorrectly transposed in the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 by excluding the provision of the 
Regulations to non-commercial undertakings. The rectification of this transposition deficit did not 
occur until 1994, and in Bradley, Ball and others v Secretary of State for Employment (1997, 
unreported) it was confirmed that government Ministers had been advised on numerous occasions of 
the breach, and despite the advice, it intentionally excluded the category of workers engaged in the 
public sector. Delays in transposition are also not uncommon. Amending legislation to the original 
ARD was due to be transposed by 2001, but the UK did not comply until five years after this deadline 
(The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006 No.246)). 
Lawyers/interested parties need awareness to review the EU parent law in the first instance to identify 
such breaches at as early a stage as possible. 
4 Starting in EU law following Case C-26/62 Van Gend En Loos v Administratie der Belastingen [1963] 
ECR 1, R-26/62, and reported in academic debate in texts such as T. Watkin, The Europeanisation of 
Law, (1998) London: UKNCCL. 
5 This being the ‘dominant orthodoxy of Community law.’ See C. Joerges, ‘The Market Without the 
State? States Without a Market? Two Essays on the Law of the European Economy’ (1996) European 
Law Journal 2(2) p. 110. 
6 See N. Kornet, Maastricht European Private Law Institute Working Paper No. 2011/17 ‘Building A 
European-Oriented Law Curriculum’ (2011): 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806916 [last accessed 18 April 2016]. 
7 B. Fauvarque-Cosson, ‘The Rise of Comparative Law: A Challenge for Legal Education in Europe’ 
7th Walter van Gerven Lecture: http://www.iuscommune.eu/html/pdf/wvg/wvg7.pdf [last accessed 18 
April 2016]. 
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sceptical of domestic transposing legislation. They would be ready to refer directly to 
EU parent laws to identify inconsistencies in transposition and to readily critique 
domestic and EU level enforcement mechanisms8 as a matter of course. As such, 
dedicated study of European public and European private laws should form a 
significant feature in any delivery of the subject, along with the practical application 
of EU law (going beyond theory and principles). 
 
EU law across the curriculum 
 
Evidently students at UK academic institutions will focus their studies on national law 
to satisfy (for as long as this holds true) professional body requirements. Yet despite 
this legitimate goal, lawyers will find it increasingly difficult to be isolated in a national 
paradigm. Much legislative action and commerce is being conducted within the EU 
and subject to EU laws, not to mention the globalisation of legal practice.9 Students 
have to possess an awareness of alternative legal systems, an appreciation of 
concepts and legal institutions, whilst also being able to critique these effectively. 
Comparative approaches to the study of law is essential at the academic stage10 of 
the students’ education because without it, the muscle-memory of analysing law, of 
questioning the source law with the transposing national legislation may never be 
fully developed. This is important, particularly where governments exhibit a 
scepticism to aspects of EU law-making and jurisprudence.11 
 
Our suggestion here is not that students study each of the legal systems of the 28 
member states. Rather the aim would be for the students to have knowledge of how 
the EU operates at a supranational level, to be able to confidently argue for national 
law to be interpreted according to the spirit of the EU parent, and for the students to 
leave their undergraduate studies with a practical appreciation of this system. 
Training through clinical suites,12 problem-based learning approaches13 and 
inquiry/active-learning where students have to work out questions to be asked in 
order to determine an outline to a legal scenario would engage them to think around 
the issues in the first instance.14 Such teaching exists at law schools,15 but this is far 
                                            
8 For a theoretical exposition of enforcement mechanisms see J. Tallberg, ‘Paths to Compliance: 
Enforcement, Management, and the European Union’ (2002) International Organization 56(3) p. 609. 
9 Which is not a new phenomenon – see K. Ross, ‘Globalisation of Legal Practice’ (1990) Singapore 
Academy of Law Journal 2(2) p. 190. 
10 See the commentary offered in A. W. Heringa, 'Towards a European Law School! A Proposal for a 
Competitive, Diversified Model of Transnational Co-Operation', in M. Faure, J. Smits, and H. 
Schneider (eds.), Towards a European Ius Commune in Legal Education and Legal Research, (2002) 
Intersentia, Antwerp, p. 3, 8. 
11 G. Drewry, ‘The Jurisprudence of British Euroscepticism: A Strange Banquet of Fish and 
Vegetables’ (2007) Utrecht Law Review: http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/ 3(2) (December). 
12 In relation to a critical analysis of mechanisms used in building pedagogical bridges between theory 
and practice see C. Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories about Lawyering’ 
(1980) Cleveland State Law Review 29 p. 555. 
13 K. H. Hirokawa, ‘Critical Enculturation: Using Problems to Teach Law’ (2009) Drexel Law Review, 
2(1), p. 1; Albany Law School Research Paper No. 31 of 2009-2010: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1550172 [last accessed 18 April 2016]. 
14 See R. Michaels, 'The Functional Method of Comparative Law', in M. Reimann, and R. Zimmerman 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2008) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
15 For example, York Law School, Nottingham Law School and the University of Sheffield use 
problem-based / inquiry-led methods. 
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from being universally adopted. A greater clinical16 approach to teaching EU law may 
also reduce the ‘ivory tower’ perception of detached Universities with few links to the 
real world (here it is real people with legal needs). Witnessing the effects on a third 
party victim of a road traffic accident (physical, emotional and financial) who is being 
denied access to a compensation fund may encourage in the student advisor 
personal reflection and desire to research the area. This would include identifying 
any available tools (the suite of domestic enforcement mechanisms available), and 
may instil the desire to challenge the national laws where the EU parent appears to 
provide a contrary view. Even if the students in such an exercise are ultimately 
unsuccessful, they will have gained a learning experience much richer than 
preparing a written or oral answer to a theoretical or problem-based question from a 
module/unit handbook. Indeed, Robert Kuehn17 identifies that US employers are 
demanding students have undergone some form of practical, clinical education 
rather than following a simulated or doctrinal model. The advantages from clinical 
education programmes are subject to provisos (including) the University ‘buy-in’ to 
the programme, adequate staffing and resourcing, appropriate levels of guidance, 
supervision and instruction for the students, and an effective balance between the 
educational benefits to the students versus providing a legal service to the public,18 
and so on.19 Of course, many universities include clinical legal education as part of 
their offer,20 but few focus directly (if at all)21 on EU issues (and we are unaware of 
any that provide advice on enforcement of EU laws). This is presented as an 
observation, not a criticism, and further research on the viability of clinics to offer 
legal advice in this area is needed. 
 
There may be benefits in directing students away from resolving problems according 
to a set of rules established nationally, and instead to being exposed, from the outset 
of their legal studies, to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)’s 
teleological approach to law-making. This may encourage the students to undertake 
detailed research into the meaning of words used in transposition, to proactively 
identify legal arguments for issues yet to appear at the CJEU, or how such 
arguments may be presented to a domestic judge. This would be to enliven our 
future lawyers with an interest in EU law. Developing the complexity of problem-
based learning exercises would be essential to ensure students can address the 
issues with confidence. The end result of students being capable EU-lawyers with 
the intellectual and practical skills to give effect to them could be a significant boost 
                                            
16 There is wealth of literature relating to the benefits that clinical legal education brings. As examples 
see: W. Rees, ‘Clinical Legal Education: An Analysis of the University of Kent Model’ (1975) Law 
Teacher, 9 p. 125; R. Grimes, ‘Reflections on Clinical Legal Education’ (1995) Law Teacher, 29 p. 
169; J. Webb, ‘Inventing the Good: A Prospectus for Clinical Education and the Teaching of Legal 
Ethics in England’ (1996) Law Teacher, 30 p. 288; J. Webb, ‘Ethics for Lawyers or Ethics for Citizens? 
New Directions for Legal Education’ (1998) Journal of Law and Society, 25 p. 134; J. Marson, A. 
Wilson, and M. Van Hoorebeek, ‘The Necessity of Clinical Legal Education in University Law Schools: 
A UK Perspective’ (2005) International Journal of Clinical Legal Education, 7 p. 29. 
17 R. Kuehn, (2014) ‘Pricing Clinical Legal Education’ Denver University Law Review, 92(1), p. 5. 
18 Evidently, teaching of the law is not the entirety of a university law school’s mission R. Browsword, 
‘Where Are All the Law Schools Going?’ (1996) Law Teacher, 30 p. 17. 
19 See K. Kerrigan, and P. Plowden, (1996) ‘Who Benefits? - Case Management And Clinical Legal 
Education’ Law Teacher, 30 p. 315. 
20 See O. Drummond, and G. McKeever, (2015) Access to Justice through University Law Clinics. 
Ulster University Law Clinics. 
21 Ibid p. 17. 
 5 
to their employability, and would certainly add to their engagement with the 
fascinating subject of contentious law and legal argument. 
 
We also offer the suggestion that there may be advantages in the delivery of EU Law 
in the first year of the students’ study. It may be considered that such an approach 
would cause problems for many students, cause confusion rather than teaching 
domestic law first, then offering some comparative law when they have understood 
the basics. This traditional view may be challenged when considering Rakoff and 
Minow22 who argue:  
 
… the template for legal thinking established in the first year of law school has 
real staying power… the greater fear is that, if we do not make the effort to 
challenge students.., students will learn to think of the legal system as only so 
many rooms, so many pieces of furniture, that they can never reorder.23 
 
Indeed, some university law schools are teaching EU law in the first year of study, 
and are developing creative ways for its delivery and assessment. Any tangible 
benefits experienced from using these methods should be disseminated so they may 
be evaluated and considered for adoption more broadly. 
 
Current approaches to teaching EU law 
 
The study of EU law24 as a discrete subject25 in many universities in the UK follows a 
similar path. The institutions and sources of law are studied. Issues of 
primacy/supremacy, the preliminary reference procedure and enforcement 
mechanisms are covered. Finally, the module is completed with some substantive 
law issues being taught,26 such as the internal market - free movement (goods / 
services / workers / capital), competition laws and/or equality / foreign policy.  
 
                                            
22 T. D. Rakoff, and M. Minow, (2007) ‘A Case for Another Case Method’ Vanderbilt Law Review 60 p. 
597. 
23 p. 607. 
24 We acknowledge that EU law is often an existing feature in modules encompassing an English 
legal system component and which forms part of the first year of undergraduate study. However, the 
necessary detailed instruction required for students to appreciate the effect of EU law and its impact 
on constitutional, procedural and substantive areas of domestic law may be lacking. Exposure to 
topics including the history of the EU, its institutions and sources of law, and primacy/supremacy is 
essential for students to achieve an understanding of EU law (as aspects typically covered in such 
modules). However, in isolation they are not sufficient. EU law as a discrete module, which covers a 
more complete range of issues, and whose principles are subsequently embodied into substantive 
modules, may better achieve the aims we are advocating. 
25 There are, of course, many examples where domestic law is influenced, admittedly to varying 
degrees, by laws established by the EU and through the judicial activism of the CJEU. Company law, 
consumer law, employment law, family law, immigration, intellectual property etc are all areas where 
the domestic lawyer must now be a European lawyer if he or she is to be fully aware of developments 
and the nuances of the interaction between both sources of obligations (for discussion see D. M. 
Curtin, J. Smits, A. Klip and J. McCahery, European Integration and Law (2006) Antwerp: Intersentia). 
26 For a detailed analysis of the teaching of EU law as a discrete subject, and its limited use as part of 
broader study in other modules, see R. Ball, and C. Dadomo, UKCLE Law Subject Survey: European 
Union Law (2010) Project Report, Unpublished: http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/14747/2/Report.pdf [last 
accessed 18 April 2016]. This is the most recent, comprehensive, study of the teaching of EU across 
universities in the UK. 
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Methods of assessment similarly often follow a conservative approach27 which would 
be helped if we were to think about:  
 
… whether the exams and essays we set measure the things we wish 
students to learn – the ability to think creatively about social implications of 
aspects of EU Law, to reflect on the impact of topical developments, and to 
spot the back up legal argument.28  
 
It is natural that both the administrative and substantive laws are included in the 
syllabus, but in many instances the actual use and investigation of how to critically 
apply EU law to inform and analyse domestic law on any detailed and discrete topic 
is overlooked. This is not to say that, for instance, competition laws are not studied - 
indeed most law graduates will be aware of Arts 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and how they are applied when anticompetitive 
behaviour crosses international borders. Nor are we suggesting that module leaders 
of topics such as employment, company or consumer law (as examples) would not 
relate important linkages between national law and EU source law. The point we 
make is that it is in the use of EU law, prior to national law, that students gain the 
clearest insight into the interplay between the systems and identify national, 
transposing law as that which has to be assessed in light of the primary EU law. 
They also begin to address legal issues from the EU source law as the starting point 
before the comparative national law is viewed (and where limited in its scope or 
incorrect in relation to the EU law, appropriate strategies can be applied). Our 
concern is that often teaching EU law, even when studying the fundamental 
freedoms is doing just that – studying EU law. It is presented as being different, 
separate and another tier of law which is unlike domestic law. Is it any wonder that 
students, having survived the EU Law module and its compulsory inclusion in a 
qualifying law degree (QLD) programme, revert to the safety of domestic law when 
choosing to practise or when providing advice to clients? Any concern with an EU 
dimension to the issue at stake can be raised in a higher court or by experts in EU 
law. What we need to embrace is how EU law affects individuals / corporations in a 
practical way and how EU law should be seen as the source to be considered in the 
first instance, with the domestic law introduced thereafter which must achieve what 
the EU parent law intended. Armed with the knowledge of the true significance of 
Marleasing29 and Pfeiffer,30 the EU law student is issued with powerful weapons. 
They will have awareness of compelling arguments presented to a first instance or 
appeal court regarding the primacy of EU law and the purposive interpretation to be 
provided in the case of inconsistencies. With Factortame,31 Francovich32 and, more 
recently, Delaney,33 students (and future lawyers) possess the knowledge of 
successful claims, and their rationale, and consequently we tutors can develop the 
confidence of lawyers to hold the State liable when in breach.  
 
                                            
27 ibid. 
28 C. O’Brien, ‘European Union Law’ in C. Hunter, Integrating Socio-Legal Studies into the Law 
Curriculum, (2012) Palgrave Macmillan p. 187. 
29 Case 106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comerical Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4315. 
30 Case C-397/01 to C-403/01 Bernhard Pfeiffer et al v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband 
Walshut eV [2004] ECR I-8835. 
31 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603, [1990] UKHL 13. 
32 Francovich, Bonifaci and Others v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357. 
33 Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] EWHC 1785 (QB). 
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Issues with continuing EU education following graduation – not just a UK problem 
 
At present, in the absence of undergraduate (academic stage) teaching of EU law in 
a comparative, pragmatic and practical manner, clients’ rights are subrogated and 
the State’s breach of its EU obligations continues unresolved. This is exacerbated by 
the fact that across the EU, many law schools do not teach EU law as a discrete 
topic as part of their vocational studies, nor do their professional bodies require them 
to do so. As of 2013, of the 28 member states in the EU only 13 provided bespoke 
EU law training at the vocational stage and of those that did include the study of EU 
law, this was predominated by an academic-centric perspective.34 As law academics 
it is probably correct to assert (we hope) that we enjoy the academic nature of our 
roles, critiquing and commenting on jurisprudential matters and predicting future 
issues and the outcomes of judgments expected from EU and domestic institutions. 
However, law students in these law schools in the 13 member states providing such 
instruction did not receive any practical training. A theoretical perspective is 
important, and we fully argue that lawyers who can think like an EU-lawyer and who 
possess a critical mind to develop the law and legal argument are essential to our 
profession. However, without knowing how the law is used in practice, how 
arguments regarding the direct effect of an EU law are successfully presented in 
national courts, or what to do in the event that a national judge lacks an appreciation 
of the application of the EU law being referred to, the law is stifled, the client does 
not obtain the correct legal representation, and the lawyer (and judge) are failing in 
their professional duties. Our lawyers will shape the future of the EU and its 
application nationally. They can give access to its rights or be complicit in its denial, 
they can develop its transparency or continue in its obfuscation, and they can assist 
in holding the State to account or leave the matter to the EU Commission (with the 
substantial practical and political problems inherent in the EU-level of 
enforcement).35 
 
Returning to the scope of EU teaching in the UK, adopting an EU-centric approach to 
instruction will provide students with a better knowledge of the EU and its rights36 - 
perhaps a laudable aim given the number of law graduates who do not proceed into 
the profession (although of course instilling increased knowledge is not necessarily 
the intended purpose when part of the QLD). It will impact on the knowledge and 
skills of national lawyers, enabling them to be familiar with key terminology and to 
identify when ‘run-of-the-mill’ enquiries concerning an element of EU law are made. 
It will, however, remain the remit of the highly specialized EU lawyers to take on the 
nuanced issues and successfully argue the points to a court’s satisfaction. Given that 
it often takes these first-instance lawyers to make the referrals to the specialists 
                                            
34 EIPA ‘Training Lawyers in EU Law 2013-14’ (2014): http://training-
lawyers.eipa.eu/files/repository/20140528110103_OREIP13A-1301-
I01_TrainingLawyersInEULaw_v2_0_en_(2).pdf [last accessed 18 April 2016]. 
35 See C. B. Jensen, (2007) ‘Implementing Europe: A Question of Oversight’ 8 European Union 
Politics 8 p. 451. 
36 This is a worthy cause in itself given that in the EU Barometer Survey 43% of respondents 
commented that they did not consider themselves well informed of their EU rights and 20% 
responded that they did not feel informed at all (Flash Eurobarometer 365 ‘European Union 
Citizenship’ (2013) Conducted by TNS Opinion & Social at the request of the European Commission, 
Directorate-General Justice at p. 21: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_365_en.pdf) [last 
accessed 18 April 2016]. 
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when that expertise is needed, it also falls on them to be in a position to identify 
when such referral is necessary.  
 
How should we teach EU Law? Areas for further thought 
 
Students need not only to learn about EU laws and to be able to recite key passages 
or to reproduce key case authorities by rote. Rather, they should learn to think like 
an EU lawyer, focusing on method and not necessarily on a restrictive approach to 
subject matter, as a means of enabling them to go beyond the study of domestic law 
and towards developing an approach to answer legal problems based on 
comparative (and sometimes conflicting) legal norms.37 The EU Law teaching should 
not simply identify areas of commonality between legal systems within the EU, but 
rather should identify and celebrate the differences between the legal systems of 
member states and the EU treaties and judicial pronouncements.38 Differences in 
approach are indeed the intended purpose of much EU legislation (hence the 
broader use of directives over regulations), but this must be within the boundaries of 
the EU acquis of the law and never at the expense of individuals’ rights. This 
requires training students and in helping them to develop their critical and practical 
skills. 
 
Beyond the practical skills and training lacking39 at the academic stage, critical 
development of the students may be improved by issuing students with a domestic 
piece of EU legislation. They are told to research and formulate advice based on a 
problem scenario, and then provided with (or asked to find) national transposing law 
and asked to identify any differences / nuances between the two. Here the students 
would naturally seek information from the primary EU law, they would be introduced 
to a new (national) source of information on the same topic but perhaps worded 
differently or with differing provisions. They can be asked to draw up possible 
problem areas or points of contention, then finally asked to discuss this (preferably 
with case examples of the arguments presented by the lawyers and the success and 
failures of each). Some form of doctrinal manipulation may be added for good 
measure. The exploration of history, systems, functions and content has value in 
academia where the educational development of students in a form which readily 
lends itself to summative assessment and grading has value and offers certainty. But 
that same methodology may be damaging where it is at the expense of core issues 
relating to the critical analysis, textual examination and jurisprudential positioning 
necessary to view both domestic and EU laws as two sides of the same coin - with 
appraisal and examination of each required before a value may be attributed to their 
worth. EU law is very much horizontally structured with its laws discoverable not just 
in its texts but also in its practice and the legal realism which embodies the EU 
institutions. Perhaps a movement away from unarticulated formalism (where we 
provide the students with rules they are expected to learn) to political realism (where 
                                            
37 A. Bernabe-Riefkohl, 'Tomorrow's Law Schools: Globalization and Legal Education', San Diego Law 
Review 32 (1995) p. 137, 149. 
38 P. Legrand, ‘The Same and the Different’, in P. Legrand and R. Munday (eds.), Comparative Legal 
Studies: Traditions and Transitions (2003) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
39 In relation to the judiciary see K. J. Alter, ‘The European Union’s Legal System and Domestic 
Policy: Spillover or Backlash?’ (2000) International Organization 54 p. 489; J. Bell, Judiciaries within 
Europe: A Comparative Review, (2006) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and A. F. Tatham, 
‘The Impact of Training and Language Competence on Judicial Application of EU Law in Hungary’ 
(2012) European Law Journal 18(4) p. 577. 
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we explain the problems that exists with non-compliant member states and how they 
behave, especially when accountability is lacking) would assist the students better in 
developing a consciousness of what to expect with domestic transposition of EU law. 
It may instil a cynicism which would better serve their clients and the development of 
consistent and accurate harmonisation of the law. 
 
It is of course easy to criticise others and indeed at our own institutions EU Law is 
taught according to the traditional method. We are making the above suggestion40 
about changing the focus of teaching EU law due to the problems witnessed with the 
lack of timely development of domestic law when this is in breach of EU law, and this 
frequently adversely affects vulnerable individuals. The case law examples and the 
use of the MIB Agreements are included in the following sections of the paper 
precisely on this basis. We can think of few more vulnerable people than those who 
are injured as a result of road traffic accidents caused by negligent, uninsured 
drivers, often sustaining life threatening or life changing injuries, and who are in need 
of compensation to cope with the aftermath. They are dependent upon 
knowledgeable lawyers to advocate on their behalf and to use the domestic and EU 
laws where available to ensure the appropriate remedies are awarded. Given the 
historic misunderstanding and misapplication of UK law,41 we can only estimate the 
(probably) several hundreds / thousands of people who have been denied rights and 
compensation, available to them at EU law. This may be compounded by the 
claimant’s lawyers failing to critique the domestic transposing laws, refer to parent 
EU laws in the cases, or because they lacked the confidence / skills to argue for a 
teleological interpretation of EU law or issue proceedings against the State when it is 
in breach. 
 
The motor vehicle insurance laws in the UK and EU - an overview 
 
Let us use motor vehicle insurance law as a vehicle (excuse the play on words) to 
demonstrate the consequences of a lack of knowledge and/or initiative on the part of 
lawyers. It also raises the imperative for students to be provided with the instruction 
and skills necessary to analyse domestic and EU rules in this area.  
 
At an EU level various directives were enacted to harmonise the rules relating to 
motor vehicle insurance. These supported the free movement principles by removing 
boarder checks. The directives, established from 1972 to the most recent incarnation 
in 2009, are collectively known as the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives (MVID).42 
Beyond facilitating the free movement of goods and people, the MVID expanded in 
range to offer protection to third party victims of motor vehicle accidents through a 
system of compensation. This was effective either through the negligent driver’s 
insurers, or through a guarantee fund established in the member states. In the UK 
this responsibility led to the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB) entering into agreements 
with the Secretary of State for Transport to fulfil this role.  
                                            
40 And we emphasise that this is suggestive rather than any attempt to be prescriptive. The dangers of 
the latter and of a single method of teaching are addressed in R. Johnstone ‘Flexible Law Teaching 
for the Late 1990’s’ (1996) 3(1) ALTA Newsletter 1. 
41 We use the term ‘UK law’ to denote the relationship with EU law and its application to the UK as a 
member state – rather than suggesting the UK has a single source of law. 
42 1st Motor Vehicle Directive 72/166/EEC; 2nd Directive 84/5/EEC; 3rd Directive 90/232/EEC; 4th 
Directive 2000/26/EC; 5th Directive 2005/14/EC; and the 6th Directive 2009/103/EC. 
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The MIB draft the agreements (one exists for the victims of uninsured drivers (the 
Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement (UDA) and another for the victims of untraced drivers 
(the Untraced Drivers’ Agreement (UtDA)) which are then concluded by the 
Secretary of State. Given that the MVID is the parent law and the UDA and UtDA, 
along with the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA88), are the transposing / implementing 
measures in the UK, the MVID establish minimum standards for the member states. 
This has significance for the cases raised in this article as the MVID establish strict 
rules relating to where the guarantee fund bodies may exclude their liability as the 
‘insurer of last resort.’  
 
Before we present the example materials it is worth briefly outlining why we chose 
this area of law. Motor vehicle insurance laws affect many people. Given the nature 
of road traffic accidents, the numbers of incidents each year43 and that personal 
injury lawyers will often find themselves dealing with such disputes, one would 
believe that a comprehensive knowledge of the law would be commonplace amongst 
those providing advice and advocating in domestic courts. The reality, however, 
appears to be different. There seems to be a significant deficit in either the lawyers’ 
knowledge of the domestic law and the EU parent directives, or their general lack of 
confidence in arguing differences in domestic and EU laws.  
 
The use of a single case as evidence for arguing that the teaching of EU law in the 
curriculum of universities in the UK is not as extensive or all encompassing as 
necessary, is for illustrative purposes. Numerous such examples exist in all 
jurisdictions, but the underlying thrust of the argument presented here is that lawyers 
very often do not use the EU law as the primary source. Instead, they concentrate on 
national implementing provisions. The evidence from motor vehicle insurance law, 
and demonstrated in numerous cases also referred to in this article, is the 
acceptance by legal professionals of the national law at face value. This is 
problematic and led, for a period of 24 years, of the law being incorrectly applied, 
until remedied in the case of Mr. Delaney. To reiterate, this is not an isolated incident. 
However, even if that was so, it is sufficient to raise questions as to the efficacy of 
the instruction and engagement with EU law provided to students at undergraduate 
level. Further, this issue appears to continue at the training level and during the 
professional development of lawyers when in practice. 
 
There are evidently many areas where a genuine misunderstanding may be present 
between EU law and the national implementing measure. Inconsistencies exist 
                                            
43 Comparison data available from the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency and the Motor Insurance 
Database estimate that approximately 2 million uninsured vehicles are in use in the UK 
(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090318085633/direct.gov.uk/en/Motoring/OwningAVehic
le/Motorinsurance/DG_067639 [last accessed 18 April 2016]). Further, the Institute of Advanced 
Motorists’ data established that young drivers (aged 25-35) were the most likely to be driving without 
insurance and that 226,803 people who were prosecuted for driving offences lacked the required 
minimum motor insurance. Statistically, uninsured drivers are more likely to be involved in fatal road 
traffic accidents (an average of 130 people per year - 
(http://www.iam.org.uk/component/content/article?id=20326 [last accessed 18 April 2016]), and such 
figures are not isolated to the UK (research from New Zealand identified that, controlling for age, 
gender and educational attainment, uninsured drivers had a five-fold chance of suffering a motor-
related injury (S. Blows, R.Q. Ivers, J. Connor, S. Ameratunga, and R. Norton, ‘Car Insurance and the 
Risk of Car Crash Injury’ (2003) Accident Analysis and Prevention 35 p. 987). 
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between member states in their transposition of some directives and there are also 
instances of opaque drafting. It is widely accepted that member state should not be 
held liable or considered to be unlawfully in breach of their obligations for an 
incorrect transposition in these circumstances. The example of motor insurance law 
does not fall into any of these categories. In none of the instances outlined below 
was the EU law and its scope in question and the national judiciary was unable to 
mount a viable argument that there was a legitimate defence to the present and 
continuing breach of EU law. 
 
Delaney and the absence of appropriate legal argument 
 
Our use of Delaney is to highlight significant breaches of EU law in the UK and how 
this was exacerbated through lawyers (and judges) deficient in the knowledge of EU 
law (a consequence of the education and training to which they have been exposed).  
 
The facts of Delaney44 are quite well known (being the subject of extensive and 
negative media scrutiny due to the nature of the issue) and so will be dealt with 
briefly here. Delaney was a front seat passenger in a Mercedes car driven by Shane 
Pickett. On 25 November 2006 the car was involved in a collision with a people 
carrier which caused Delaney life threatening injuries. He survived, however, when 
treated at the scene of the accident, Delaney was found to have on his possession a 
(large) quantity of cannabis and a smaller quantity was discovered on Pickett. 
Latterly, Pickett accepted that the accident was his fault and the drugs belonged to 
him, not Delaney. Due to there being some 274g of cannabis found between the 
occupants, and the offence of dangerous driving, Pickett received a 10-month 
custodial sentence. 
 
Delaney sought to recover damages for the injuries he suffered in the accident and 
brought his claim against Pickett, as the driver at fault, and Tradewise (the insurers 
of the Mercedes) were joined as an interested party. In addition to his admission of 
the ownership of the drugs found, Pickett had a self-confessed drug dependency, he 
was a diabetic45 and he was also subject to a medical diagnosis for depression - 
facts which were not passed on to Tradewise when issuing the insurance policy. 
These facts were of significant benefit to the insurer. Under the RTA88 s. 152, a 
motor insurance policy may be avoided by the insurer on the basis of the non-
disclosure / false representation of a material fact. Tradewise applied to the court for 
a declaration that the policy was void under s. 152 and on 4 March 2009 the order 
was granted. Further, following proceedings initiated by Delaney on 23 April 2009, 
Gregory J held, on public policy grounds, Pickett was not liable to compensate 
Delaney for his injuries (nor consequently was Tradewise). Gregory J continued that 
even had Pickett been so liable, liability would have been avoided because of cl 
6(1)(e)(iii) of the UDA 1999 which excludes the MIB from liability where a ‘crime 
exemption’ applies.  
 
                                            
44 Delaney v Pickett [2011] EWCA Civ 1532. 
45 An estimated 3.9 million people in the UK have diabetes. Of those who have driving licences, it 
would be interesting to identify how many have informed their insurers of their condition when insuring 
their vehicle (Diabetes UK (2015) ‘Diabetes: Facts and Stats’ May: 
https://www.diabetes.org.uk/Documents/Position%20statements/Facts%20and%20stats%20June%20
2015.pdf [last accessed 18 April 2016]. 
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Incorrect application / lack of knowledge 
 
Delaney’s first instance case, and indeed that in the Court of Appeal, proceeded on 
the basis that Pickett was an uninsured driver for the purposes of the MIB 
Agreement and further that cl 6(1)(e)(iii) was a valid exclusion to liability. Both 
propositions are incompatible with EU law. The errors contained in the decisions 
were highlighted in Delaney’s later cases46 for damages against the state for breach 
of EU law where Jay J47 said, as of 1990, the EU law in these areas was fully 
evolved. 
 
First, and perhaps the most concerning aspect of the jurisprudence applied in 
Delaney,48 was that none of the lawyers had referred to the crime exemption clause 
in UDA 1999 and its incompatibility with the MVID. The ‘crime exemption’49 applies, 
according to the UDA 1999, in respect of a claim: 
 
…by a claimant who, at the time of the use giving rise to the relevant liability 
was voluntarily allowing himself to be carried in the vehicle and, either before 
the commencement of his journey in the vehicle or after such commencement 
if he could reasonably be expected to have alighted from it, knew or ought to 
have known that… (iii) the vehicle was being used in the course or 
furtherance of a crime…’ 
 
The MVID incorporates permitted derogations50 from the obligation of ensuring 
compulsory insurance of vehicles, whilst also expressing a (non-exhaustive)51 list of 
possible exclusions which would be held as void against third parties.52 Essentially, 
the MVID permit the exclusion from compulsory insurance of vehicles in only one 
respect - the victim was a passenger who allowed himself to be carried in the vehicle 
in the knowledge that it was stolen. No other exclusion is permitted to this category 
of victim and any attempt to exceed the scope of this article is a breach of EU law. 
Authority for this interpretation of the MVID was provided by the CJEU in Ruiz 
Bernaldez.53 In a judgment delivered by Ward LJ, the Court of Appeal concluded that 
the use of a finite list in RTA88 s.148(2)54 (as the transposing measure of the 
possible exclusions of liability) was, by implication, instructive that all contractual 
exclusion clauses outside of this list were permissible. Further, Ward LJ purported to 
rely on an interpretation that the CJEU’s decision in Bernaldez did not enjoy general 
application. This was an unusual decision when considered in light of Bernaldez55 
                                            
46 Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] EWHC 1785 (QB) and Delaney v Secretary of 
State for Transport [2015] EWCA Civ 172. 
47 Supra n 34. 
48 Supra n 45. 
49 An exclusion clause removed from the updated UDA 2015 Agreement in response to the Delaney 
judgments. 
50 Art.5. 
51 Case C-129/94 Rafael Ruiz Bernáldez [1996] ECR I-1829. Here, the CJEU purposively interpreted 
the list of void exclusions (in Art.2(1) of the Second MVID (now Art.13(1) of the Sixth MVID)) as being 
illustrative and thereby extending the scope of the civil liability insurance requirement in Art.3(1) of the 
First MVID. 
52 Art.13 Directive 2009/103/EC. 
53 Bernáldez n 52. 
54 A list of exclusions from insurance policies which would not be valid – e.g. to do with the vehicle’s 
condition, the weight it carries, its horsepower etc. 
55 Bernáldez n 52. 
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given that even a cursory review of the jurisprudence of Correia Ferreira v 
Companhia de Seguros Mundial Confiança SA,56 Candolin v 
Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhtio Pohjola,57 Farrell v Whitty,58 and Churchill v Wilkinson 
and Tracey Evans59 demonstrates the CJEU’s consistent interpretation of 
permissible exclusions of liability consistently within the strict reasoning of 
Bernaldez.60 Indeed, in Candolin the CJEU commented on its previous interpretation 
where it held ‘[the MVID]… precludes an insurer from relying on statutory provisions 
or contractual clauses in order to refuse to compensate third-party victims of an 
accident caused by the insured vehicle.’61 To further compound this error, the Court 
of Appeal in Churchill62 had, 18 months previously, referred the matter of permitted 
exclusions of a third party victim to the CJEU63 and had already received guidance in 
accordance with Bernaldez.64 
 
The judges focused on the MVID and as there was no similar provision within those 
directives and the exclusion provided in cl 6(1)(e), they inferred that the exclusion 
nationally must be valid. Further, as the lawyers in the case had not raised the 
issues relating to the compatibility with the MVID, the judges decided not to consider 
the matter. It is difficult to identify whether the Court of Appeal, in ignoring the case 
law and references to the CJEU, was negligent, misunderstood its obligation to 
follow CJEU rulings, or did not consider that RTA88 ss. 148(2) and 152 or cl 6(1)(e) 
was subject to a consistent interpretation in accordance with the MVID. Latterly, the 
Court of Appeal agreed that the MIB Agreement was in breach of EU law, a fact 
known to the government for several years previously, in the separate case by 
Delaney against the Secretary of State under a state liability action.65 This breach 
was not remedied until the most recent MIB Agreement was (hastily) concluded in 
July 2015. 
 
Inclusion of the MIB in proceedings 
 
The MIB, as the guarantee fund and insurer of last resort, is required to take the 
place of the insurer where a driver who caused the accident leading to the claim did 
not have insurance cover. This lack of appreciation of the role of the MIB and where 
and when it is invoked was evident in Delaney. At the time of the incident the vehicle 
used by Pickett was subject to a third party motor insurance policy and the MIB 
Agreement is only applicable where no insurance cover is provided. The insurer had 
a legal obligation to satisfy claims based on the policy (as the statutorily-guaranteed 
insurer) and as such the crime exemption clause contained in the MIB’s UDA 1999 
                                            
56 Case C-348/98 Vitor Manuel Mendes Ferreira and Maria Clara Delgado Correia Ferreira v 
Companhia de Seguros Mundial Confiança SA [2000] ECR 1-6711. 
57 Case C-537/03 Katja Candolin, Jari-Antero Viljaniemi and Veli-Matti Paananen v 
Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhti&ouml Pohjola and Jarno Ruokoranta [2005] ECR I-5745. 
58 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty (C-356/05) [2007] ECR I-3067.  
59 Case C-442/10 Churchill Insurance Company Limited v Benjamin Wilkinson and Tracy Evans v 
Equity Claims Limited [2011] ECR I-00000. 
60 None of these cases were referred to in the judgment. 
61 at [18]. 
62 Churchill Insurance v Wilkinson; Evans v Equity & Secretary of State for Transport [2012] EWCA 
Civ 1166. 
63 Supra n 60. 
64 Bernáldez n 52. 
65 Supra n 47.  
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would not have been effective at any point in the proceedings. Again, on this point, 
the lawyers involved in the initial Delaney case, nor the judge, thought it appropriate 
or applicable to raise this issue.  
 
Constructive knowledge 
 
To add to the problems in Delaney, the wording of the crime exemption was not 
challenged as being incompatible with the MVID. The use of the words ‘knew or 
ought to have known …’ introduced a constructive knowledge criterion to be applied 
to the claimant which, since White v White66 resulted in the italicised words being 
ignored. Despite the removal of the offending ‘crime exemption’ clause in the UDA 
1999, cll 7 and 8 of the (new) UDA 2015 continue this phraseology and will likely be 
subject to challenge at some future date. The correct test to be applied remains of 
‘provable’ knowledge (according to EU rules), not constructive knowledge (the UK’s 
implementing measure). 
 
Training received by the judiciary – a lack of appropriate legal education? 
 
The Delaney v Pickett cases do demonstrate poor decision-making and limited use 
and reference to superior EU case law. This raises issues about the training received 
by judges on matters to do with EU law and its application, although ‘… a number of 
studies show that national judges experience difficulties in exercising EU 
competences due to their lack of knowledge in the field of EU law’.67 Indeed, 
following Delaney’s original case and its dismissal of an appeal, in 2011, by the 
Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court refused permission for further appeal on the 
basis that Delaney’s application failed to ‘… raise an arguable point of law of general 
public importance which ought to be considered by the Supreme Court in the light of 
the judge’s findings of fact with which this Court cannot interfere and the plain 
wording of clause 6(1)(e) of the Agreement.’68 
 
Domestic judges are expected to play a crucial role in the advancement and 
protection of EU rights, having a knowledge of the substantive laws and procedural 
obligations. In so doing they act as decentralised EU judges69 by researching the 
relevant EU primary and secondary laws. They should have an awareness of the 
case law of the CJEU, where precedents are already established, and where points 
of law would be acte clair.70 They need to know when to use the preliminary 
reference procedure (cooperating with the CJEU), and to have an understanding of 
the need for a consistent interpretation of domestic laws through Marleasing71 and 
                                            
66 White v White [2001] UKHL 9. 
67 J. A. Mayoral, U. Jaremba, and T. Nowak, ‘Creating EU Law Judges: The Role of Generational 
Differences, Legal Education and Judicial Career Paths in National Judges’ Assessment Regarding 
EU Law Knowledge’ (2014) Journal of European Public Policy, 21(8), p. 1120, 1120. 
68 See https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/PTA-1205.pdf [last accessed 14 September 2015]. 
69 U. Jaremba, National Judges as EU Law Judges: The Polish Civil Law System, (2014) Leiden-
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
70 On the basis of a case being subject to acte clair, the CJEU may simply issue a reasoned order to 
the member state and the judge is referred to the pertinent, earlier, judgment (Art. 99 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court of Justice). 
71 Supra n 30. 
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Pfeiffer.72 Further, when to disapply inconsistent domestic laws (via Factortame)73 
and to apply the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (via Mangold),74 whilst 
recognising that the claimant may be entitled to be compensated for damages 
incurred due to the State’s breach of EU law (via Francovich)75 are essential skills. 
All too often, members of the judiciary seemingly lack knowledge of the law to be 
able to fulfil this role76 nor do they possess adequate information to apply these laws 
effectively.77 
 
Mayoral et al’s (2014) research into the efficacy of the judiciary in applying EU law 
focused on factors including the age of the judges, their educational and judicial 
training and their practical experience with the application of the law. Albeit that this 
research involves self-assessment by the respondents, and the various caveats 
regarding issues of truth and self-awareness are included, it does offer greater 
information than that which would likely be obtained by an external evaluator. The 
responses received pointed to candid answers about the judges’ own understanding 
of their lack of awareness or ‘incompetence.’78 Previous studies had investigated 
whether younger lawyers, familiar with studying EU law as part of their university 
education, had fewer difficulties in the application of EU law and its principles.79 
Other studies have found that a judge’s reputation has a strong influence on his or 
her performance, and as EU law will form part of the cases heard in court, and given 
                                            
72 Supra n 31. 
73 Supra n 32. 
74 Case C-144/04 Mangold v Rudiger Helm [2006] All ER (EC) 383. 
75 Supra n 33. 
76 See European Parliament and Academy of European Law (2011) ‘Study on judicial training in the 
European Union member states’, EP Studies. Resolution of 14 March 2012: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-
2012-0079+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN [last accessed 18 April 2016]; U. Jaremba, ‘At the 
Crossroads of National and European Union Law. National Judges in a Multi-Level Legal Order – 
Legal and Empirical Perspective’ (2013) Erasmus Law Review p. 191: 
http://www.elevenjournals.com/tijdschrift/ELR/2013/3_4/ELR-D-13-00006 [last 
accessed 18 April 2016]: 199; U. Jaremba, and T. Nowak, ‘The Role of EU Legal Education and 
Training in the Functioning of National Courts as Decentralized EU Courts. An Empirical Investigation 
into the Polish and German Civil Judiciary’, in V. Cattelan (ed.), Integration Through Legal Education? 
The Role of EU Legal Studies in Shaping the EU, Bologna: Societa editrice il Mulino, (2012) p. 111; T. 
Nowak, F. Amtenbrink, M. L. M. Hertogh, and M. H. Wissink, National Judges as European Union 
Judges, (2011) Den Haag/Portland: Eleven International Publishing. 
77 M. Bobek, ‘A New Legal Order or a Non-Existent One? Some Early Experiences in the Application 
of EU law in Central Europe’ (2006) Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 2 p. 265; M. 
Bobek, ‘On the Application of European Law in (not only) the Courts of the New Member States: 
“Don’t do as I Say"?’, in C. Barnard (ed.), Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2007 – 
2008, (2008) Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 1; Z. Kuhn, ‘The Application of European Law in the New 
Member States: Several (Early) Predictions’ (2005) German Law Journal 6(3) p. 563; S. Prechal, R. 
H. van Ooik, J. H. Jans, and K. J. Mortelmans, Europeanisation of the Law: Consequences for the 
Dutch Judiciary, (2005) The Hague: Raad voor de Rechtspraak; A. F. Tatham, ‘The Impact of Training 
and Language Competence on Judicial Application of EU Law in Hungary’, (2012) European Law 
Journal 18(4) p. 577. 
78 p.1122. 
79 Bobek, supra n. 71 at 295; A. Bullen, ‘Norway’, in C. Brokelind (ed.), Towards a Homogeneous EC 
Direct Tax Law, Netherlands: IBFD 2007, p. 261, 302–3; L. Conant, ‘European Judicial Review and 
National Institutional Change’, in A.P. Cortell and S. Peterson (eds), International Relations, Domestic 
Politics, and Institutional Change, (2003) Oxford: Lexington Books, p. 27, 52; F. Le Bail, Speech on 
‘Conference on judicial training’, 10 April 2013: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/files/francoise_le_bail_en.pdf [last accessed 18 April 2016]. 
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necessity here for timely, legally correct knowledge and application of the law, older 
judges may have an increased incentive to ensure they are sufficiently aware of 
current practice.80 It is also imperative that judges receive the appropriate training 
and guidance of EU law principles as part of their university education. This can 
establish itself as one of the most significant features in developing the skills and 
competences needed by the judiciary.81 
 
It is also an interesting finding that Mayoral et al (2014) discovered social networks82 
positively influence the judges’ knowledge of EU law.83  ‘This finding emphasizes the 
relevance of EU transnational/cross-border networks and personal contacts and 
discussion with foreign colleagues that seems to facilitate judges’ learning 
processes.’84 Their research also concluded that continuous judicial training in EU 
law and working on cases with an EU dimension improved their sense of its 
relevance and importance, ultimately leading them to report that they were more 
knowledgeable about EU law as a consequence.85 It was further worth noting that 
the judges in Poland considered themselves more knowledgeable of EU law than did 
the respondents in Germany. Poland, a member state from 2004 compared with 
(West) Germany, a founding member state, required its judges to undergo intensive 
training and education regarding EU laws in preparation for that state’s entry. This 
was primarily based on ‘foundation’ issues, but which had profound and positive 
effects on the judiciary’s use and familiarity with giving effect to EU laws 
domestically. This approach to training appears to be significantly more robust than 
establishing a system of competences with which lawyers have to apply. It also 
points to the positive effect that practical training has on lawyers – an approach 
which would lend itself to undergraduate law students. 
 
There are many other breaches of the MVID in domestic law, and these are 
perpetuated on a daily basis through application of national law which is in breach of 
EU law.86 If lawyers and judges are not familiar with EU law in this area or where the 
issue is not at least raised in the case, claimants are being denied justice. The EU 
Commission has complete discretion as to whether it pursues infringement 
proceedings against a member state and, for whatever reason, despite information 
as to the breaches being provided in extensive form to it, it chooses not to pursue 
the matter. This only serves to emphasise the necessity of having competent EU 
lawyers in the UK to protect legal rights which are breached through governmental 
abrogation and the EU Commission’s obduracy. 
                                            
80 M. R. Schneider, ‘Judicial Career Incentives and Court Performance: An Empirical  
Study of the German Labour Courts of Appeal’ (2005) European Journal of Law and Economics, 20, 
p. 127. 
81 J. M. Smits, ‘European Legal Education, or: How to Prepare Students for Global Citizenship?’ 
(2010) Maastricht European Private Law Institute Working Paper No. 2011/02.  
82 See also M. Claes, and M. De Visser, ‘Courts United? On European Judicial Networks’, in A. 
Vauchez and B. De Witte (eds), Lawyering Europe: European Law as a Transnational Social Field, 
(2013) Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 75; and R. Cowan and N. Jonard, ‘Network Structure and the 
Diffusion of Knowledge’ (2004) Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 28(8) p. 1557. 
83 See also E. Lazega, ‘Mapping Judicial Dialogue Across National Borders: An Exploratory Network 
Study of Learning from Lobbying Among European Intellectual Property Judges’, (2012) Utrecht Law 
Review 8(2) p. 115. 
84 at p. 1131. 
85 at pp. 1131-34. 
86 J. Marson, K. Ferris, and A. Nicholson, ‘Irreconcilable Differences? The Road Traffic Act and the 
European Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives’, (2016) Journal of Business Law (in press). 
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Conclusions 
 
This article has highlighted limitations in current approaches to teaching EU law in 
many universities in England. That this continues is often because the modules / 
units where EU law is delivered tend to subscribe to a pre-established syllabus. Any 
substantive aspect of EU law within a particular area of competence is left to the 
module where that subject is delivered (and presumably it is for that teaching team to 
determine how much time is devoted to the nuances and critique of the sources of 
law). This approach can lead to the current situation, observable in motor vehicle 
insurance law, where inconsistencies in national law are frequently and inadequately 
dealt with by lawyers87 and judges. Teaching EU law differently will be a step in the 
right direction of creating a cohort of future lawyers, judges and legal draftsmen who 
will be trained in identifying the practical application of EU law and principles. If it 
were introduced from the first year of study, and taught not as an additional facet of 
the syllabus but as a central component of it,88 tangible benefits to students’ 
understanding of EU law and its broad application may be the consequence. Our 
mindset should be of EU law as a pervasive element to the students’ legal education 
and continued training.    
                                            
87 Save for a few exceptions including the lawyer Nicholas Bevan (an expert in EU motor insurance 
law) who has worked tirelessly in this area in both practice and though a range of publications in 
practitioner and academic journals. 
88 For instance, Universities including East Anglia, Exeter, Kent, Kings, London South Bank, Queen 
Mary, Reading, Robert Gordon, Sheffield, Southampton, Warwick, and Westminster offer dedicated 
EU law based LLB programmes (albeit the offers can involve substantial study of EU law integrated 
into the course, and/or a traditional LLB programme with a year of study at a partner European 
institution).  
